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The traditional model of medical delivery, in
which the doctor is trained, respected, and com-
pensated as an independent craftsman, is
anachronistic. When a patient has multiple ail-
ments, there is no longer a simple doctor-
patient or doctor-patient-specialist relationship.
Instead, there are multiple specialists who have
an impact on the patient, each with a set of
interdependencies and difficult coordination
issues that increase exponentially with the num-
ber of ailments involved.
Patients with multiple diagnoses require
someone who can organize the efforts of multi-
ple medical professionals. It is not unreasonable
to imagine that delivering health care effectively,
particularly for complex patients, could require
a corporate model of organization.
At least two forces stand in the way of robust
competition from corporate health care providers.
First is the regimeof third-party fee-for-servicepay-
ment, which is heavily entrenched by Medicare,
Medicaid, and the regulatory and tax distortions
that tilt private health insurance in the samedirec-
tion. Consumers should control the money that
purchases their health insurance, and should be
free to choose their insurer and health care
providers.
Second, state licensing regulationsmake it dif-
ficult for corporations to design optimal work
flows for health care delivery. Under institutional
licensing, regulators would instead evaluate how
well a corporation treats its patients, not the cre-
dentials of the corporation’s employees. Altern-
atively, states could recognize clinician licenses
issued by other states. That would let corpora-
tions operate in multiple states under a single set
of rules and put pressure on states to eliminate
unnecessarily restrictive regulations.
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Introduction
Reasonable people disagree about how best
to finance health care. However, everyone
agrees that health care delivery in America is
highly inefficient. Patients donot see outcomes
commensurate with our country’s sharply ris-
inghealthcare expenditures.Credible estimates
suggest that one-third of health care spending
is wasted.1 Measures show quality of care often
falling short of best practices.2 Estimates of
medical error rates are alarmingly high.3
Those macro-level indicators of inefficien-
cy are reinforced when one examines health
care delivery from a process perspective. There
is a lack of coordination of care, particularly
for complex patients with chronic illnesses or
multiple health problems. Late-stage care and
treatment of chronic illness together account
for perhaps three-fourths of all health care
spending.4 Fee-for-service payments arewidely
viewed as distorting medical treatment.5
Existing fee-for-service systems discourage
doctors from “wasting” time interviewing and
examining patients, fail to reward prevention,
and encourage doctors to overutilize certain
types of equipment and procedures.6 There is
considerable friction between doctors and
their remote “supervisors” from Medicare,
Medicaid, and private insurance companies.
The use of information technology, such as
electronic medical records, appears to fall far
short of its potential.7
The Times,
They Are A-Changin’
Several trends have converged for which
the current institutional framework for
health care delivery is not well prepared.
Technological innovation and increases in
specialized knowledge have dramatically
alteredeverydaymedicalpractice.Thechallenge
of complex patients has increased, in part as a
result of that progress: more conditions have
become treatable, thusmorepatientshavemul-
tiple diagnoses. As death rates resulting from
preventable injuries,heartattacks, andcommu-
nicable disease fall, more people live to reach a
stage where multiple breakdowns occur at
once.
Fifty years ago, the typical patient encoun-
tered one doctor and was treated for a single
complaint. Today, the patients who use the
most services are being seen by multiple spe-
cialists and treated for multiple ailments.
Americanshavebeen shifting their priorities
from other material goods to health care, as
reflected in the fact that the shareofhealth care
spending in national income has roughly dou-
bledover thepastgeneration.Perhapsrelatedto
that, the share of health care expenses paid for
out of pocket has plummeted over the past 50
years, while the share of expenses paid for by
third parties has climbed to over 85 percent.8
All of America’s health care financing
mechanisms are under stress. The cost of pro-
viding insurance is rising in Medicare and
Medicaid, as well as in the private sector.
Company-providedhealth insurance is becom-
ing a major proportion of employee compen-
sation.Medicare andMedicaid face an increas-
ingly bleak financial future.9 This has led to
increasingly frequentandoftencrudeattempts
to reduce physician compensation, even as the
demand for care increases.
Delivery Lags Technology
Given all of these trends, it is not surprising
that the traditional model of medical delivery,
in which the doctor is trained, respected, and
compensated as an independent craftsman, is
anachronistic.
When a patient has multiple ailments, this
traditional model breaks down. There is no
longer a simple doctor-patient or doctor-
patient-specialist relationship. Instead, there
aremultiple specialistswhohave an impact on
the patient, each with a set of interdependen-
cies and difficult coordination issues that
increase exponentially with the number of ail-
ments involved.
Today, the typical patient is more like
Arnold’s late father. Prof. Merle Kling was
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diagnosed at the age of 88 with esophageal
cancer. A month later, he fell and broke his
hip, and then found himself in eight differ-
ent hospital units over the course of three
weeks. As he was moved from floor to floor,
each unit seemed to pick up on a problem
that the previous unit had missed—or per-
haps had caused. His greatest suffering was
caused by infected bed sores that developed
while he was in the hospital. He remained
under hospital care for two more months,
until he died.
Professor Kling likely received hundreds
of thousands of dollars in health care ser-
vices, almost all paid for byMedicare or addi-
tional insurance. During his father’s illness,
Arnold observed firsthand the lack of conti-
nuity and coordination of care, which squan-
dered the sincere efforts of many individual
doctors and nurses.
Complex patients requiremore than inde-
pendent craftsmen. An independent crafts-
man can fix your sidewalk, but he cannot
build a highway interchange. An indepen-
dent craftsman can create a website for your
soccer team, but he cannot build a computer
system to support the operations of a finan-
cial services firm.
Organizational Competence
To serve the needs of complex patients,
medical care delivery needs to include more
than just the skills of doctors and nurses.
Complex patients require coordination, plan-
ning, better communication, more attention to
process, and accountability. The importance of
planning, communication, accountability,
and so forth suggests a need for organization-
al competence in addition to pure technical
skills.
A Project Manager
Treating a complex patient is comparable
to building a house. Thework of a number of
skilled craftsmen needs to be planned and
managed. When unexpected problems occur,
someone needs to revise and adapt the plan.
In constructing a house, that role is played by
a general contractor.
For complex patients, there should be one
person who is aware of all aspects of the
patient’s needs andwho acts as a projectman-
ager. Except in cases of dire emergency, the
first person a complex patient sees upon diag-
nosis should be the project manager, who
would formulate a plan to get the patient well.
The project manager would anticipate prob-
lems and balance risks, adjusting the plan as
needed.
It should be a project manager’s job to
anticipate risks such as bed sores, which
afflicted Arnold’s father. Under the existing
approach, noone took responsibility for antic-
ipating or dealing with that risk until it was
too late.
The projectmanager should be responsible
for ensuring adequate communicationamong
all parties. Thatmeans ensuring that everyone
involved in the patient’s care, including the
patient, is involved in making the plan and is
kept informed of changes and other issues
that require attention. The project manager
should coordinate the work of medical spe-
cialists by bringing them together, if necessary,
in order to go over the trade-offs and resolve
issues.
A homebuyer typically does not oversee
the day-to-day construction work. Instead,
buyers may be involved in the initial plan-
ning process, and they may be consulted as
different problems present themselves along
the way. Likewise, medical care today is too
sophisticated for complex patients to be their
own project managers—though they should
remain the project manager’s boss.
The project manager may or may not be
anM.D., but doctors would have to treat this
person as the boss—just as in home building,
where an electrician acknowledges that the
general contractor is the boss.
Medical care typically lacks coordination,
in part because payment systems such as
Medicare have not kept pace with technology
and patients’ changing needs, and because
many doctors are unwilling to cede authority
to a boss. Medicare and other payers continue
3
Medical
care lacks
coordination,
in part because
Medicare has not
kept pace with
technology and
patients’
changing needs.
113117 Cato Bp111.qxp  12/29/08  1:14 PM  Page 3
to pay doctors according to the independent-
craftsman model. For example, Medicare’s
payment system generally does not reward
coordination. Instead,Medicare andother fee-
for-service payers tend to favor technologically
intensive specialist services over those of gen-
eral practitioners who might be best suited to
play the role of project manager. The mis-
matchbetweenpayment systemsandpatients’
needs can be seen in the fact that the supply of
gerontologists is not increasing, in spite of the
obvious demographic basis for greater
demand and the value gerontologists can add
as project managers for those who are least
able to coordinate their own care.10
Physicians’ resistance tomanagerial author-
ity is legendary. According to one colorful
account:
While many physicians fall prey to an
illusion of omnicompetence and believe
that their medical training endowed
them with superior management judg-
ment, most are incapable of submitting
to the authority of anyone, even a fellow
physician. Many physicians selected
their profession based upon their need
for autonomy and individual achieve-
ment. As a consequence, many lack the
interpersonal skills or civility to func-
tion as part of a larger enterprise . . . A
few less-temperate administrators actu-
ally pop off in medical staff meetings
about how different things will be
“when all you bastards finally work for
me.”11
In the home-building analogy, it is as if the
concrete contractor, the drywall contractor,
the electrician, and the plumber all refuse to
work under a general contractor. Instead,
they each try to do their jobs independently,
regardless of the impact on the rest of the
project. No one craftsman is in a position to
take responsibility for delivering the overall
finished product, and quality suffers as a
result.
Physicians have been more successful
than other professionals in resistingmanage-
rial authority. Their success comes not from
any inherent aspect of medical practice but
from government protection.12 Licensing of
medical professionals, state health insurance
regulations, corporate-practice-of-medicine
laws, and policies that encourage fee-for-ser-
vice payment (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, and
the federal tax code) hold at bay the market
forces that would improve coordination of
care by subjecting physicians to managerial
authority.
SeniorManagement
Coordinated health care teams in turn
would benefit from senior-level management
that constantly examines how well their plans
are working, retains those that deliver positive
outcomes, and discards those that do not.
When bottlenecks or errors arise, manage-
ment must brainstorm solutions, test them,
and implement those that work. In other
words, senior management must be account-
able for overseeing processes that lead to the
best possible outcomes for patients.
Such organizational advances are not
entirely foreign to medicine. Some hospitals
rely on “intensivists” to coordinate treatment
in intensive care units, though this innovation
has yet to be widely adopted. Gerontologists
coordinate care for elderly patients, yet remain
a relative anomaly, despite the obvious value
they could provide to the growing number of
adults who struggle to care for their children
and their aging parents at the same time.
Intensivists employ checklists of standardpro-
cedures to reduce errors in intensive-care
units.13 These advances illustrate how man-
agement techniques borrowed from industrial
settings can be used to improve health care.
Yet prevailing payment andworkforce policies
have inhibited these and similar innovations.
A Role for Corporations
The challenge of developing organization-
al competence is the chief focus of the mod-
ern corporation.14 The very purpose of cor-
porations is to reduce transaction costs
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between parties.15 It would be very costly for
a wealthy individual or large firm to contract
with several highly specialized but indepen-
dent lawyers and accountants. Thus themar-
kets for legal and accounting services are
dominated by corporate providers that can
hire, coordinate, and monitor the services of
those specialists.
In medicine, transaction costs include the
costs of soliciting input, sharing informa-
tion, and coordinating treatment among
multiple clinicians, often across space and
time. Thus it is not unreasonable to think
that delivering health care effectively, partic-
ularly for complex patients, could require a
corporate model of organization. Just as
most homes today are built by large regional
companies, the typical health care provider
might turn out to be a corporate entity.
Perhaps large national corporations would
dominate the health care industry.However, it
would seem more likely that, as with home
building, no major dominant national firm
would emerge. Small firms would compete
alongside large regional companies. Solo prac-
titioners could continue to serve consumers
with less complicated needs, as with legal and
accounting services.
Health care companies could straighten
out lines of accountability and provide coor-
dinated care. For complex patients, the cor-
poration would assign a project manager.
The project manager would bring to bear
whatever resources are appropriate for meet-
ing the patient’s needs.
A patient-focused corporate provider
would not waste skilled craftsmen through
failure to coordinate their work. If the
patient’s needs are best served by a team, then
the corporation would train its personnel to
work in teams.
A corporation would develop compensa-
tion systems that align the incentives of its
employees with the interests of its customers,
the patients. If team behavior is valuable to
the patient, then the compensation system
would reward team behavior. If hands-on
evaluation of the patient is more helpful
than sending the patient for an MRI, then
the corporationwould reward hands-on eval-
uation.
A corporatemodel of health care would set
standards for its employees. Rather than leave
the quality of care to the whim of the individ-
ual doctor, the corporationwould try tomake
sure that all of its employees use state-of-the-
art methods and share best practices.
A corporation would standardize proce-
dures and treatment plans, such as inten-
sivists’ use of checklists, using corporate
guidelines. With procedures that are stan-
dardized and rationalized, it would pay to
deploy information technology to support
those procedures, thus reducing costs and
preventing errors.
In a corporate setting, a doctor would not
have a business or administrative function.
The doctor would not worry about what is
billable and what is not. Instead, the doctor’s
job would be to serve patients according to
corporate standards. The doctor would be
paid a salary, with increases, bonuses, and
other incentives that take into account direct
observation of the doctor as well as patient
satisfaction and peer evaluations.
Acorporate compensation systemwouldbe
administered by onsite managers, rather than
by remote control. Doctors and other employ-
eeswould be paid on the basis of howwell they
execute corporate policy andmeet the needs of
patients, not on the basis of how well they fill
out forms to game the systemof fee-for-service
medicine as administeredby insurance compa-
nies or government bureaucrats.
Because many patients present unique
challenges, however, doctors likely would have
discretion to deviate from guidelines based on
their judgment about a particular patient.
Management could take theoutcomesof such
cases into account when deciding on compen-
sation. A doctor whose deviations help to
improve outcomes could receive a higher
bonus than a doctor who simply follows
guidelines or a doctor whose deviations pro-
duce inferior results.
The Veterans Administration and Kaiser
Permanente, both of which have been praised
by observers,16 exhibit some components of
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whatwecall the corporatemodelofhealth care.
Both pay physicians on salary, rather than on a
fee-for-service basis. In effect, both receive a set
amount of money per customer to keep their
patients well. Both have been leaders in deploy-
ing electronic medical records, which enable
coordination of care. Kaiser Permanente offers
bonuses to its clinicians to ensure that patients
receive recommended services.17
Yet a corporate model does not necessari-
ly mean an integrated HMO model, which
combines the functions of health care
provider and insurance company. The com-
pany providing health care need not be the
same as the insurance company.
Putting Patients ahead of
Providers
If you ask doctors, you will find that they
want more autonomy, more reward for ideas
that work, less severe penalties for mistakes,
and less competition. That is what every
worker in every profession wants. What mat-
ters in health care, however, is the interest of
the patient.
Some doctors practicing today would be
unhappy in a corporate environment. They
may value their autonomy and resent having
to answer to a boss who is not as technically
skilled as they are (an issue familiar to engi-
neers, among others). On the other hand, a
corporationmightbe able tooffer doctors bet-
ter work-life balance, more relief from admin-
istrative hassles, better information technolo-
gy systems, and aday-to-day environment that
operates more smoothly. Most doctors want
to see their patients treated well, and if a cor-
poration better serves the interests of a com-
plex patient, doctors will be happier working
in that environment than in an environment
where the patients suffer because of flaws in
the system.
The health care delivery system will prob-
ably include doctors whowork in a corporate
environment and doctors whowork in small-
er practices. Complex patients will tend to be
handled by corporate medical care, but the
majority of patients can be handled by either
a corporation or a small practice.
OpeningMarkets to
Corporate Competition
There is nothing magical about a corpora-
tion as an organization. Corporate bureaucra-
cies are inherently inflexible, imperfect, and
unimaginative. Competitive market pressures
force corporations to overcome those limita-
tions and are therefore essential to improving
medical care. If corporations risk losing cus-
tomers when they fail to keep pace with mar-
ket standards for excellence, they will find a
way to improve—or go out of business.18
At least two forces stand in the way of
robust competition from corporate models
of health care delivery. First, there is the
regime of third-party fee-for-service reim-
bursement, heavily entrenched by Medicare,
Medicaid, and the regulatory and tax distor-
tions that tilt employer-provided health care
in the same direction. Second, there are med-
ical practice regulations thatmake it difficult
for corporations to design optimal work
flows for health care delivery.
Let the Patient Control theMoney
Most doctors want to serve patients. But
there is a conflict: the patient is not the one
who pays the bills. Instead, the customer that
health care providers must learn to serve is
the private insurance company or the govern-
ment program. If doctors want to get paid in
today’s environment, they have to play by
rigid third-party rules imposed by employers
and government, not patients’ choices.
Reducing our reliance on third-party pay-
ments will not be easy. Ourmoral instinct tells
us not to take advantage of someone in dis-
tress. That translates into a reluctance to have
individual patients pay for their own health
care services. Unfortunately, insulating con-
sumers from the cost of what they buy is
incompatible with efficiency. In health care,
third-party payments force providers to serve
twomasters—the patient and the bureaucrat.
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In order to put patients first, we will need
to see innovation in insurance. One possibil-
ity is fixed-dollar benefits that go to patients on
the basis of the diagnosis. Another possibili-
ty would be insurance with higher cost-sharing
through copayments and deductibles. A
third possibility would be for corporations to
receive a fixed amount from each customer to
provide medical care to that population.
The fixed-dollar-benefit approach has yet
to succeed in health insurance. Given the
tremendous uncertainty in medicine, and the
fact that a lot of health care spending goes for
diagnostic procedures, that approach may
have only limited applicability. However, to
the extent that it could be employed, it would
give patients the incentive to shop carefully for
treatment and to choose the most cost-effec-
tive procedures.
Higher cost-sharing would also give
patients more responsibility for paying for
more of their health care directly. That would
likewise reduce the temptation for doctors to
recommend procedures with high costs and
low benefits.
In order for patients to be able to exercise
better judgment, the whole process for
billing patients probably should be changed.
From the patient’s point of view, an itemized
bill, delivered days or weeks after a hospital
stay took place, is not particularly helpful. It
may be preferable for the corporation to pre-
sent to the patient, as soon as possible, a
complete plan for getting the patient well.
This plan should include a fixed, all-inclusive
price, which can be evaluated by both the
patient and the patient’s insurer. If the plan—
including the price—is not satisfactory, then
either the corporation modifies the plan or
the patient goes elsewhere. Over time, if the
plan needs revision, the parties may revisit
the price, as in homebuilding.
Corporations could also offer patients an
all-inclusive price for whatever ailments might
befall themover the courseof a year ormultiple
years. This is known as prepayment, and
appears to work best when the health insurer
andthedelivery systemarepartof the samecor-
porate entity, as with organizations such as
Group Health Cooperative and Kaiser Perma-
nente. Such corporations would compete with
other financing structures to improve quality
and reduce the cost of care.
For this process to work, consumers must
control themoney that purchases their health
insurance,must be free to choose their insurer
and health care providers, and must have
information about how different corpora-
tions deliver health care. One consumer may
prefer a low-cost corporate provider, while
anotherprefers ahigh-end firm.Thequality of
the market will depend on the emergence of a
good set of consumer information and rating
services that allow consumers to see how well
various corporations are performing at meet-
ingpatientneeds.All corporationswould then
be under pressure to deliver good value for the
consumer’s money.
Deregulate theMedical Workforce
In order for health care corporations to
function effectively, regulation of health care
wouldhave to change. Regulators could evalu-
ate how well a corporation treats its patients,
not the credentials of the corporation’s
employees. The current model, in which gov-
ernment licenses and (supposedly) regulates
each individual practitioner, could be replaced
by amodel inwhich the government regulates
at a corporate level. Government should ask
whether a corporation is operating in a man-
ner that is consistent with the promises that it
makes to customers. The government should
nothave to askwhether the corporate employ-
ee administering a test for strep throat has a
particular credential.19
In Maryland, where one of us lives, new
physical therapists must have a doctorate in
order to practice. The other lives in Virginia,
which does not require a doctorate. While
these sorts of education requirements sup-
posedly exist to protect patients, the reality is
that they are used by professionals to restrict
supply and suppress competition.20
As patients, we do not care whether we
receive care from someone with an advanced
degree or someone who has completed a com-
pany apprenticeship. If a corporate provider
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develops a less expensivemethod of delivering
superior outcomes and is willing to stake its
reputationon it, that corporation shouldhave
the opportunity to compete.Wewill take qual-
ity care from anyone.
Corporations providing health care would
be evaluated by consumers, both informally
through word of mouth and formally on web-
sites, in magazines, and by consumer groups.
Just as in any other market, corporations
would have an incentive to attain good reputa-
tions.
The market regulates quality by driving
inferior firms out of business. If that process
is insufficient, then government regulators
could be empowered to license and revoke
licenses of corporate health care providers.
Note that with any regulatory system, the
regulated entities will attempt to “capture” the
regulator and to use regulations to restrict
competition. Under our current system of reg-
ulating individual practitioners, the revocation
of licenses is a step rarely taken. Economist
Shirley Svorny writes that “state boards have a
poor record of disciplining errant physicians”
and that “one might conclude that licensure
offersmore protection tomalfeasant clinicians
than to consumers.”21 This is another way in
which our current regulatory structure favors
the provider, not the patient. The net benefits
(or costs) of institutional licensing would have
to be weighed against the net costs of the cur-
rent system of licensing individual medical
professionals.
Another alternative would be for states to
recognize clinician licenses issued by other
states.22 That would let health care corpora-
tions operate in multiple states under a single
setof licensingregulations, andwouldputpres-
sure on states to eliminate regulations that are
unnecessarily restrictive. Each state could take
that step on its own, or Congress could require
states to recognize each other’s licenses.
Conclusion
America needs real reform in health care.
The fiscal outlook for our government health
care programs is worse than that in other
countries, even where populations are aging
more dramatically. In many countries, bud-
getary limits force health care spending to
stay within a fixed target. Under Medicare,
with fee-for-service reimbursement, we have
no effective spending control mechanism.
The Congressional Budget Office has point-
ed out that our health care sector’s excess
cost growth, in which spending continues to
grow faster than the GDP, is unsustainable.
Better ways of delivering medical care are
available. But without entrepreneurial mech-
anisms, market incentives, and vigorous
competition, these approaches tend to
remain isolated exceptions, rather than gen-
eral practice.
Eventually, we will have to consider radi-
cal new ways to organize health care delivery.
To improve health care quality and to reduce
its cost, we need to eliminate barriers to com-
petition by corporations.
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